Traditionally, cognitive, motivational, and volitional determinants have been used to explain and predict health behaviors such as physical activity. Recently, the role of affect in influencing and regulating health behaviors received more attention. Affects as internal cues may automatically activate unconscious processes of behavior regulation. The aim of our study was to examine the association between affect and physical activity in daily life. In addition, we studied the influence of the habit of being physically active on this relationship. An ambulatory (...) assessment study in 89 persons (33.7% male, 25 to 65 years, M = 45.2, SD = 8.1) was conducted. Affect was assessed in the afternoon on 5 weekdays using smartphones. Physical activity was measured continuously objectively using accelerometers and subjectively using smartphones in the evening. Habit strength was assessed at the beginning of the diary period. The outcomes were objectively and subjectively measured moderate-to-vigorous physical activity (MVPA) performed after work. Multilevel regression models were used to analyze the association between affect and after work MVPA. In addition, the cross-level interaction of habit strength and affect on after work MVPA was tested. Positive affect was positively related to objectively measured and self-reported after work MVPA: the greater the positive affect the more time persons subsequently spent on MVPA. An inverse relationship was found for negative affect: the greater the negative affect the less time persons spent on MVPA. The cross-level interaction effect was significant only for objectively measured MVPA. A strong habit seems to strengthen both the positive influence of positive affect and the negative influence of negative affect. The results of this study confirm previous results and indicate that affect plays an important role for the regulation of physical activity behavior in daily life. The results for positive affect were consistent. However, in contrast to previous reports of no or an inverse association, negative affect decreased subsequent MVPA. These inconsistencies may be—in part—explained by the different measurements of affect in our and other studies. Therefore, further research is warranted to gain more insight into the association between affect and physical activity. (shrink)

Algorithmic decision-making increasingly shapes people's daily lives. Given that such autonomous systems can cause severe harm to individuals and social groups, fairness concerns have arisen. A human-centric approach demanded by scholars and policymakers requires considering people's fairness perceptions when designing and implementing algorithmic decision-making. We provide a comprehensive, systematic literature review synthesizing the existing empirical insights on perceptions of algorithmic fairness from 58 empirical studies spanning multiple domains and scientific disciplines. Through thorough coding, we systemize the current empirical literature along (...) four dimensions: (1) algorithmic predictors, (2) human predictors, (3) comparative effects (human decision-making vs. algorithmic decision-making), and (4) consequences of algorithmic decision-making. While we identify much heterogeneity around the theoretical concepts and empirical measurements of algorithmic fairness, the insights come almost exclusively from Western-democratic contexts. By advocating for more interdisciplinary research adopting a society-in-the-loop framework, we hope our work will contribute to fairer and more responsible algorithmic decision-making. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet's celebrated experiments concerning freedom elicited numerous attempts of _philosophical_ repudiation. Ten years ago, however, Judy Trevena and Jeff Miller published a _technical_ objection; they claim to have detected a,,smearing artifact" in Libet's calculations. This rests on a misunderstanding of Libet's methodology. In my reconstruction of Libet's argument, he draws an abductive inference to the best explanation. Now, Trevena's and Miller's objection does indeed lead to alternative explanations of Libet's measurements. These alternatives are _ad hoc_ and extremely improbable. They (...) constitute worse explanations than the explanation offered by Libet. _German_ Benjamin Libets bahnbrechende Experimente zur Willensfreiheit aus den Achtziger Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts gehören längst zu den Klassikern der Experimentalkunst. Aus _philosophischer_ Perspektive sind sie oft kritisiert worden; unabhängig davon ist zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends ein _technischer_ Einwand gegen Libet prominent geworden, der von Freiheitsfreunden gerne zitiert wird. Er geht auf Judy Trevena und Jeff Miller zurück und besteht in dem Vorwurf, dass Libet mit seiner Berechnung der _gemittelten_ Bereitschaftspotential-Kurven die wahren Verhältnisse verschmiere und dabei aus mathematischen Gründen den Anstiegs-Zeitpunkt des Bereitschaftspotentials künstlich nach vorne verschiebe – das ist der Vorwurf des sog. Verschmierungsartefakts. Ich zeige, dass der Vorwurf nicht sticht. Er beruht auf einem Missverständnis der Schlussmethode Libets. Laut meiner wissenschaftstheoretischen Rekonstruktion zieht Libet weder deduktive noch induktive Schlüsse aus seinen Einzelbeobachtungen; er schließt abduktiv, d.h. er schließt auf die beste Erklärung seiner Einzelbeobachtungen. Wie eine genaue arithmetische Analyse zeigt, bieten die Alternativ-Erklärungen, unter denen sich das Verschmierungsartefakt bewahrheiten würde, schlechtere Erklärungen als Libets Erklärung – sie sind an den Haaren herbeigezogen und extrem unwahrscheinlich. (shrink)

Die postmoderne Philosophie ist nichts anderes als »das Nachleben des Nationalsozialismus in der Demokratie«. Weil der radikale Bruch mit dem Denken, das zu Auschwitz führte, ausblieb, weil vielmehr bereits in den sechziger Jahren gerade von links in vermeintlich tabubrecherischer Weise versucht wurde, die nationalsozialistische Philosophie für scheinbar »emanzipatorische« Projekte nutzbar zu machen, erscheint die deutsche Ideologie heute als links und progressiv. Diese neueste deutsche Ideologie ist nicht nur eine philosophische Strömung, sondern Ausdruck einer gesellschaftlichen Tendenz. Die postmoderne Übung, jede allgemeine (...) Begriffsbestimmung als »logozentrisch« und jede Betrachtung der Gesellschaft unter Vernunftkriterien als totalitär zu denunzieren, ist sowohl Reflex der objektiven Unbrauchbarkeit der Welt unter den Verhältnissen spätkapitalistischer Vergesellschaftung als auch der Versuch einer Sinnstiftung ebendieser Verhältnisse. In seinem Kult der Unmittelbarkeit schließlich sucht der Poststrukturalismus den Schulterschluß mit dem radikalen Islam und verrät jede Idee von Versöhnung. Mit Beiträgen von Manfred Dahlmann, Martin Dornis, Alex Gruber, Birte Hewera, Tjark Kunstreich, Philipp Lenhard, Niklaas Machunsky, Florian Ruttner und Gerhard Scheit. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract (...) its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another’s needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one’s reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals. (shrink)

It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this, holding that moral considerations bear on the epistemic status of our attitudes. According to attitude-based theories of moral encroachment, morality encroaches upon the epistemic standing of our attitudes on the grounds that we can morally injure others with our epistemic practices. In this paper, I aim to show that current attitude-based theories have asymmetric mechanisms: moral features only make it (...) harder for attitudes to secure epistemic merits. I argue that, if attitudes can incur moral injury, failure to form attitudes can too. To make sense of this, I contend, attitude-based accounts require symmetric mechanisms, allowing that moral considerations make it both harder and easier for attitudes to attain epistemic merits. I maintain that, once we recognize this, attitude-based encroachment views must soon concede that they sometimes demand we believe against the evidence. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses existing accounts of the nature of difficulty, finds them wanting, and proposes a new account. The concept of difficulty is routinely invoked in debates regarding degrees of moral responsibility, and the value of achievement. Until recently, however, there has not been any sustained attempt to provide an account of the nature of difficulty itself. This has changed with Gwen Bradford’s Achievement, which argues that difficulty is a matter of how much intense effort is expended. But while (...) this account captures something important about the relationship between difficulty and achievement, it fails to account for the fact that part of what makes achievements great is that they are difficult in a moderately agent-neutral kind of way. Nor is this thought captured by any other extant account. I argue that to fill this gap we should think of difficulty in terms of low probability of success. (shrink)

The structure of derivations in natural deduction is analyzed through isomorphism with a suitable sequent calculus, with twelve hidden convertibilities revealed in usual natural deduction. A general formulation of conjunction and implication elimination rules is given, analogous to disjunction elimination. Normalization through permutative conversions now applies in all cases. Derivations in normal form have all major premisses of elimination rules as assumptions. Conversion in any order terminates.Through the condition that in a cut-free derivation of the sequent Γ⇒C, no inactive weakening (...) or contraction formulas remain in Γ, a correspondence with the formal derivability relation of natural deduction is obtained: All formulas of Γ become open assumptions in natural deduction, through an inductively defined translation. Weakenings are interpreted as vacuous discharges, and contractions as multiple discharges. In the other direction, non-normal derivations translate into derivations with cuts having the cut formula principal either in both premisses or in the right premiss only. (shrink)

Business ethics denial refers to one of two claims about moral motivation in a business context: that there is no need for it, or that it is impossible. Neither of these radical claims is endorsed by serious theorists in the academic fields that study business ethics. Nevertheless, public commentators, as well as university students, often make claims that seem to imply that they subscribe to some form of business ethics denial. This paper fills a gap by making explicit both the (...) various forms that business ethics denial can take, and the reasons why such views are ultimately implausible. The paper argues that this type of serious engagement with business ethics denial should be an important part of the job description for teachers of business ethics. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Arbeit enthält Bemerkungen über den Intuitionismus and über seine Beziehungen zu anderen Gebieten der Grundlagenforschung. Innerhalb der intuitionistischen Mathematik werden, im Anschluss an die Kritik von Griss gegen den Gebrauch der Negation, Evidenzstufen unterschieden, abhängend von der Art, in der bedingte Konstruktionen zugelassen werden. Auch werden gewisse Schwierigkeiten in der Theorie der endlichen Spezies diskutiert. Was die Grundlagenforschung im Aligemeinen betrifft, wird bemerkt, dass sie die klassische Mathematik weitgehend in ihre intuitiven, formalen and platonischen Bestandteile zerlegt hat. Es wird (...) näher eingegangen auf die These von Church in der Theorie der rekursiven Funktionen.RésuméL'article contient des remarques sur l'intuitionisme et sur ses rapports avec les autres directions dans la recherche des fondements. Dans la mathématique intuitioniste, et en connexion avec la critique de Griss contre l'usage de la négation, on distingue des degrés d'évidence, dépendant de l'espèce de constructions conditionnées qui est admise. En outre, on discute certaines difficultés dans la théorie des espèces finies. Concernant la recherche des fondements en général, on remarque que les mathématiques classiques ont été scindées en leurs éléments intuitifs, formels et platonistes. Quelques remarques sur la thèse de Church dans la théorie des fonctions récursives terminent l'article.The paper contains remarks on intuitionism and its relations with other domains of foundational research. Inside the intuitionistic mathematics, in connection with Griss' criticism against the use of negation, different degrees of evidence are distinguished, depending upon the way in which conditioned constructions are admitted. Some difficulties in the theory of finite species are discussed. Concerning the foundational research in general it is observed that it has separated intuitive, formal and platonistic constituents in classical mathematics. Some remarks are made on Church's thesis in the theory of recursive functions. (shrink)

African (Bantu) philosophy conceptualizes morality through ubuntu, which emphasizes the role of community in producing moral agents. This community is characterized by practices that respond to and value interdependence, such as care, cooperation, and respect for elders and ancestral knowledge. While there have been attributions of morality to nonhuman animals in the interdisciplinary animal morality debate, this debate has focused on Western concepts. We argue that the ubuntu conception of morality as a communal practice applies to some nonhuman animals. African (...) elephant communities are highly cooperative and structured around elders; they alloparent, protect their communities, mourn their dead, and pass on cultural knowledge between generations. Identifying these as important moral practices, ubuntu provides a theoretical framework to expand our ethical concern for elephants to their communities. In practice, this will deepen our understanding of the wrongness of atrocities like culling for population management or trophy hunting. (shrink)

Business models are developed and managed to create value. While most business model frameworks envision value creation as a uni-directional flow between the focal business and its customers, this article presents a broader view based on a stringent application of stakeholder theory. It provides a stakeholder value creation framework derived from key characteristics of stakeholder theory. This article highlights mutual stakeholder relationships in which stakeholders are both recipients and creators of value in joint value creation processes. Key findings include that (...) the concept and analysis of value creation through business models need to be expanded with regard to different types of value created with and for different stakeholders and the resulting value portfolio, i.e., the different kinds of value exchanged between the company and its stakeholders. This paper details the application of the stakeholder value creation framework and its theoretical propositions for the case of business models for sustainability. The framework aims to support theoretical and empirical analyses of value creation as well as the management and transformation of business models in line with corporate sustainability ambitions and stakeholder expectations. Overall, this paper proposes a shift in perspective from business models as devices of sheer value creation to business models as devices that organize and facilitate stakeholder relationships and corresponding value exchanges. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

A normalization procedure is given for classical natural deduction with the standard rule of indirect proof applied to arbitrary formulas. For normal derivability and the subformula property, it is sufficient to permute down instances of indirect proof whenever they have been used for concluding a major premiss of an elimination rule. The result applies even to natural deduction for classical modal logic.

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

Includes "Coldness and Cruelty," by Gilles Deleuze, a study of masochism and sadism, as well as "Venus in Furs," the original novel by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.

Normative ethics concerns the criticism and justification of morality, law, and other systems of norms. This book develops a normative ethical theory based on individuals and offers a third way beyond the dominant paradigms of Kantianism and Utilitarianism. This theory can assist us in answering concrete ethical questions. The book discusses, for example, the existence of duties to oneself, the permissibility of paternalistic decisions for others, and the status of supererogatory actions. It also considers various problems in bioethics. Key features: (...) Development of a new normative ethical theory Up-to-date overview of the topic Written in clear and comprehensible style Provides answers to concrete ethical problems Also of interest for doctors, lawyers, and economists ". (shrink)

Narrative imagination, as MarthaNussbaum (1996) discusses it, is ``the abilityto be an intelligent reader of another person'sstory'', an ability tied to being a democraticand cultivated world citizen, one whounderstands the lives of others. Narrativeimagination does not only need knowledge andlogical reasoning but also love and compassion.This article argues that in order to be agenuine tool for democracy, narrativeimagination and consciously taking theperspective of others has to be based on anunderstanding of humans as basicallypluralistic, as homines aperti. Criticalexamination and reflection should (...) be broughtcloser to the lives we live and confront ourhabits and implicit values in order tocultivate us as humans so that we are genuinelyaffected and touched. (shrink)

Some have tried to make miracles compatible with the laws of nature by re-defining them as something other than interventions. By contrast, this article argues that although miracles are divine interventions, they are not violations of the laws of nature. Miracles are also not exceptions to the laws, nor do the laws not apply to them. The laws never have exceptions; they never are violated or suspended, are probably necessary and unchangeable, and apply also to divine interventions. We need to (...) reconsider not miracles but laws. The main claim of this article is that laws of nature do not entail regularities, and therefore that miracles do not violate the laws. We need a new theory of the laws of nature: the tendency theory. (shrink)

The contribution starts with the observation that Kant mentioned Human Dignity in his main works with great variety in emphasis. In the 'Grundlegung' from 1785 we find a significant treatment and again in the 'Tugendlehre' from 1798 but none in the 'Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft' from 1788 and in the 'Rechtslehre' from 1797. This needs an explanation. In the 'Grundlegung' human dignity is not attached to the second formula of the categorical imperative, the formula of self-purposefulness, as it is often (...) assumed, but to the third formula of a kingdom of ends. It is there explained as self-legislation. This placement needs also an explanation, which is attempted by the article. In the 'Tugendlehre' human dignity is then explained as self-purposefulness. So Kant changed his understanding of human dignity from the 'Grundlegung' to the 'Tugendlehre'. But the question is: why? (shrink)

Michael Freund (1902-1972) war der erste Professor für «Wissenschaft und Geschichte der Politik» an der Universität Kiel und gehörte damit zur einflussreichen Gründervätergeneration der westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft nach 1945. Sowohl Freunds universitäres und wissenschaftliches Wirken als Politikwissenschaftler und Historiker als auch sein politisches Engagement und seine umfangreiche journalistische Tätigkeit stehen im Fokus dieser Studie. Somit stellt die Arbeit nicht nur die erste Biographie Freunds dar, sondern bietet zugleich einen Einblick in eine stark historisch orientierte Richtung der frühen westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft. Darüber hinaus (...) leistet sie einen Beitrag zur Verständigung über Wissenschafts- und Universitätsgeschichte nach 1945. (shrink)

The standard rule of necessitation in systems of natural deduction for the modal logic S4 concludes □A from A whenever all assumptions A depends on are modal formulas. This condition prevents the composability and normalization of derivations, and therefore modifications of the rule have been suggested. It is shown that both properties hold if, instead of changing the rule of necessitation, all elimination rules are formulated in the manner of disjunction elimination, i.e. with an arbitrary consequence.

This article explores the political potential of Kierkegaard's Repetition and develops a model of non-sovereign agency by analysing the figure of the ‘young man’, the main protagonist of the book. A curious reference in Schmitt's Political Theology serves as a cue for exploring Repetition through contrast with Schmitt's notions of sovereignty, decision and exception, as well as his critique of occasionalism in Political Romanticism. As in the case of Schmitt's sovereign, the young man's conflict is centred on the question of (...) the exception. But by contrast to the former, the young man struggles with the exception from a position of opposition to the powers that govern. Furthermore, the exception in Repetition does not seek to stabilise a given order in the face of a threat, but, rather, to destabilise and transform order. The perspective offered facilitates a shift from thinking the exception as a state of exception, a concept that mostly concerns state politics, to an exception from the state. Kierkegaard's Repetition is thus shown to be relevant for conceptualising transformative agency from a position of marginalisation and exclusion from the hegemonic political order. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Swedish hunters sometimes appeal to an inviolate ‘right to exist’ for wolves, apparently rejecting NIMBY. Nevertheless, the conditions existence hunters impose on wolves in practice fundamentally contradict their use of right to exist language. Hunters appeal to this language hoping to gain uptake in a conservation and management discourse demanding appropriately objective ecological language. However, their contradictory use of ‘right to exist' opens them up to the charge that they are being deceptive – indeed, right to exist is a 'disguised (...) NIMBY!' We address this situation by distinguishing hunters’ criticisms of wolves from the procedures for reaching objective policy decisions. (shrink)